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Abstract 
We describe the integration of logical and 
uncertain reasoning methods to identify the 
likely source and location of software prob­
lems. To date, software engineers have had 
few tools for identifying the sources of error 
in complex software packages. We describe 
a method for diagnosing software problems 
through combining logical and uncertain­
reasoning analyses. Our preliminary results 
suggest that such methods can be of value in 
directing the attention of software engineers 
to paths of an algorithm that have the highest 
likelihood of harboring a programming error. 
' 
1 INTRODUCTION 
We describe the integration of logical and uncertain 
reasoning methods to reason about the likely source 
and location of software problems. In particular, the 
methods have application to problems with maintain­
ing and refining a large, complex piece of software that 
is used and refined over many years. Such corporate 
legacy software typically has a long history of evolu­
tion, growing and changing with contributions from 
many software engineers over time. Problems may be 
detected years after a software update or modification. 
In many cases, the software is poorly documented and 
incompletely tested. Frequently, people charged with 
the task of debugging find that engineers responsible 
for particular portions of program code have long since 
been promoted to other positions, or have left the com­
pany. 
We have experimented with the application of uncer­
tain reasoning to software debugging as part of the 
DAACS project, a doctoral research effort at the Uni­
versity of Texas at Arlington, and an ongoing project 
at the SABRE Knowledge Systems Group of American 
Airlines. DAACS (for Dump Analysis and Consult­
ing System) is a program developed to assist software 
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engineers to determine sources of software errors in 
SABRE, the most widely used time-shared reservation 
system in the world. Complex interactions by clients 
with the SABRE system, and continuing software de­
velopment without complete verification, lead to inter­
mittent problems that are recorded internally for later 
evaluation. In earlier work (Burnell and Talbot, 1993), 
we explored the use of a belief network for computing 
the likelihoods of alternative high-level explanations 
for software errors, based on a global analysis of the 
values of important variables in a program trace. In 
this paper, we describe a new approach being taken 
in DAACS-II that integrates the output of a logical 
analysis of feasible paths with probabilistic analyses 
of each path so as to prioritize the efforts of a software 
engineer in exploring different program paths to debug 
SABRE system software. 
2 PROBLEM FOCUS 
An autonomous program debugger must analyze a pro­
gram to gain information about its behavior and iden­
tify the cause or causes of some set of faults. We have 
concentrated on applying logical and uncertain rea­
soning methods for interpreting the source of an ab­
normal termination of mainframe assembler language 
programs. Abnormal termination occurs when a pro­
gram or subprogram in a timeshared environment vi­
olates an operating-system constraint. For example, 
an attempt may have been made by a process to ref­
erence an area of memory that is not allocated to that 
process. When an operating system detects such a vi­
olation, data are collected and formatted in a trace 
of recent history called a memory dumpfile, or dump. 
Engineers typically debug complex mainframe assem­
bler language problems by poring over dumpfiles from 
programs that terminate abnormally. 
A typical dumpfile contains a snapshot of relevant 
parts of memory at the time that an illegal opera­
tion occurred. The trace includes information about 
register contents, the processor status word, the pro­
gram counter, the program object code, the memory 
location, and contents of program data. Software en­
gineers, armed with a memory dump and a program 
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listing, pursue the source of a problem by identifying 
the specific instruction that led directly to the pro­
gram termination, and then trace backwards through 
the operation of the program along execution paths 
in search of the principle cause of the termination. A 
valid execution path is a sequence of program instruc­
tions that could have been executed, depending on the 
outcome of conditional branch instructions. Along the 
way, several other key pieces of data from the memory 
dump may be examined to provide clues. 
Debugging is intrinsically a problem of reasoning un­
der uncertainty because the snapshot provided by in­
formation from a memory dump, and a recent history 
of the program operation before the system encoun­
tered an illegal operation, is an incomplete description 
of the software. In particular, we are uncertain about 
the identity of the execution path that was taken to 
reach the error. Typically many alternative paths are 
candidates and, thus, much of the effort of debugging 
is expended on determining the failing path. 
As highlighted in Figure 1, our work on decision­
support for debugging has two components: 
1. Logical analysis to identify possible execution 
paths, and 
2. Probabilistic analysis using a belief network for 
software failure to sort paths by the likelihood 
that the error resides on the paths, as well as to 
identify the likelihoods of alternative problems on 
each path. 
The output of the analysis is an ordering over paths 
by likelihood, and a subdivision of the task of ana­
lyzing each path into an ordering over the likelihood 
of alternative classes of problem. Such orderings can 
speed the debugging process by minimizing the num­
ber of paths that must be explored before a problem 
is identified. 
3 OPERATING SYSTEMS AND 
PROGRAM UNDERSTANDING 
Our work on identifying execution paths draws upon 
techniques developed in work on program understand­
ing. Program understanding tasks vary depending 
on the complexity of the processes being analyzed, 
and the level of abstraction available for debugging. 
For example, large, time-shared assembler programs 
provide challenges that are not usually encountered 
in microcomputer-based programs that are compiled 
from higher-level structured languages. With large as­
sembler programs, variables are pointers that can ac­
cess any part of memory and the code is unstructured. 
Also, input----output, execution traces, and intended 
behavioral descriptions are typically unavailable and 
are difficult to derive. Therefore, engineers must ex­
amine program structure and infer intended program 
behavior. 
There has been ongoing related work on automated 
program understanding (APU). APU programs build 
abstract representations of a program and related in­
formation to facilitate reasoning (see, for example, 
(Arbon et al., 1992; Hartman, 1992; Kozaczynski 
et al., 1991; Lenz and Saelens, 1991; Selfridge, 1991). 
Most program understanding systems seek to match 
portions of programs to prototypical implementation 
plans. Applications pursued by APU researchers in­
clude student programming tutors, design recovery 
and reuse of software, and program language transla­
tion. In most APU projects, designers have sought to 
develop methods to interpret and understand an entire 
program segment. In the realm of automated program 
debuggers, the APU task involves understanding just 
enough about program behavior to determine failures 
in the code. In theory, this task is not as ambitious 
as comprehensive program understanding. However, 
unlike some of the work on program understanding, 
this and several other debugging projects concentrate 
on solving real-world problems with complex software, 
far from the realm of toy problems that are typically 
explored in research settings. Our system must oper­
ate on the software as it is written and can draw only 
on the information available in the existing memory 
dump. As mentioned earlier, the software that we seek 
to understand is unstructured assembler code that has 
been modified over several decades and that has never 
been tested comprehensively. 
The DAACS system begins an analysis of a memory 
dump by searching for erroneous execution paths in 
assembler programs running under the IBM TPF1 op­
erating system. In response to an input request (e.g., 
for a list of airline fares), a collection of program seg­
ments are activated to process the request. For this 
paper, we shall focus on problems with program seg­
ments attempting to reference pages of memory that 
are protected by other processes. 
As background, each segment may be thought of as 
a function or subroutine within a traditional program. 
At activation, all of the segments are loaded in memory 
and a structure called the entry control block (ECB) is 
created in memory. All segments can access this mem­
ory. The ECB contains control and status information, 
and a small amount of storage for a work area (scratch 
data). Sixteen fixed-size areas of memory, called core 
blocks, may be dynamically requested or freed by any 
of the program segments. The location, size and status 
(free versus held) of all core blocks is recorded in the 
ECB. Working memory is divided into alternating pro­
tected and unprotected pages, indicated by a protect 
key of 0 and 1, respectively. All application segments 
use pages that are labelled as available to processes by 
having protect keys set to 1. As working memory is 
filled, the operating system makes new protected ar­
eas available by setting the segment protect keys to 1 
when the memory is free for use. Free pages of mem-
1TPF is a widely used operating system designed for 
transaction processing. 
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Figure 1: Overview of logical and uncertain reasoning approach. A memory dumpfile generated at the time of an 
error is analyzed to generate a graph of feasiable execution paths. Each path is analyzed with a belief network 
to generate a list of paths prioritized by the likelihood that a path harbors an error. 
ory may be reprotected by other processes. An illegal 
memory reference occurs when a segment attempts to 
reference a protected page. 
4 LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF 
EXECUTION PATHS 
Our goal is to determine the root error in a program 
segment. The root error is the initial instruction, or 
sequence of instructions upstream in a segment, that 
led to an erroneous situation that was detected by the 
operating system. For example, a common, detectable 
error for many programming languages and operat­
ing systems occurs when an instruction attempts to 
manipulate memory that was previously allocated to 
another process. For example, a variable in one pro­
cess might point to a location that is outside a legal 
range of memory. Thi!> type of presentation is called a 
PASTHELD error. 
4.1 Methods 
To generate a set of feasible execution paths, we must 
backtrack from an error. We can represent a program 
as a directed graph where nodes are basic blocks of 
code and arcs represent the flow of execution control 
from a parent block to child blocks. Such graphs allow 
us to trace back along execution paths. In operation, 
only a single execution path is taken by the computer. 
Unfortunately, we usually cannot identify the single 
path taken before an error occurred. The values of 
variables in program segments can be assigned by ac­
tions defined in program segments that are outside the 
scope of the local segment analysis. We must consider 
loops and tmnsfer points-commands that bmnch the 
possible flow of control from one basic block to several 
others based on the values of variables that are dy­
namically set by processes which lay outside the scope 
of an analysis. T hus, we must analyze blocks, looping, 
and branching instructions to identify and investigate 
feasible execution paths. 
During the path-identification phase, we can attempt 
to refute or rule-out paths, via a logical analysis of 
components of the structure and triggers in a program. 
Many execution paths in a program may be pruned 
because they can be proven impossible based on the 
program structure and information that is available 
about the data input to a process. 
Further simplification is possible because we need only 
to examine partial paths. For certain classes of errors, 
the first step in determining why an error occurred at 
an instruction is to examine the operands and their 
values to determine which variable (operand or con­
stituent register) is clearly out-of-bounds. A trace 
backwards along a feasible execuation path from the 
point of the error terminates when an out-of-bounds 
variable is discovered along the path between the er­
ror and the first operation in a block that designates 
the value of the variable. In such cases, we know that 
the problem occurred either at the instruction where 
the variable was assigned or somewhere along the path 
between the assignment instruction and the error. 
The logical reasoning component of DAACS employs 
such deterministic reasoning to generate a directed 
graph representing possible execution paths that flow 
to a detected memory-pointer error. The system then 
applies logical analysis to do path pruning. We have 
found that pruning is computationally feasible because 
the number of paths is generally small (less than 200 
paths) and the task can be done quickly. 
4.2 An Example 
Let us consider a real debugging situation. We are 
alerted that a problem has been detected by the op­
erating system running a critical reservations system: 
A pointer variable, VARl, had been pointing to an 
area of memory that was allocated to another process. 
We note that this is a PASTHELD error, as VAR is 
pointing to a location that is 80 bytes outside a legal 
strip of memory. Assume that we are given a memory 
trace that contains the program code, the instruction 
at which an illegal memory reference occurred, and the 
values of relevant variables at the time the error oc­
curred. Our goal is to determine the root error, the 
initial instruction upstream in the program that led to 
the error that was detected by the operating system. 
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Program Start 
0 
BLOCK A: 
1. set var3=var4 (set outside segment) 
2. set var1=var2 (set outside segment) 
3. if var3 = 0 goto·label y 
BLOCK B: 
4. label x: 
0 
5. set var1 = var1 + 80 
0 
0 
6. set var3 = var3 - 1 
7. if var3 = 0 goto label x 
BLOCK C: 
8. label y: set var2 = some value 
9. set var3 = some value 
10. set var4 = some value 
11. print var1 << * * * ERROR * * * 
0 
Figure 2: Execution path identification example show­
ing a block of instructions that are executed in a local 
sequence. 
In this case, the root error is the out-of-bounds value 
assigned to VARl. 
Given the location of the error and knowledge about 
the program, we begin to examine the structure of 
the execution paths. A partial listing of a program 
is shown in Figure 2. Figure 3 displays a control-flow 
graph of these instructions. Three basic blocks of code 
are displayed. A basic block is a set of instructions 
that is executed in a sequence. The only entrance to 
a basic block is to the first instruction, and the only 
exit from a basic block (to other blocks) is via the last 
instruction in that block. 
The DAACS logical path-analysis component au­
tonomously identifies multiple execution paths from 
the program statements given in Figure 2. Let us rep­
resent a component of an execution path from a parent 
block to a child block as Parent-Child. In doing a pro­
gram tracing, DAACS notices the branching statement 
(a goto command) at the end of BLOCK A. Because it 
cannot determine the value that the branching state­
ment was acting on in this case, it must consider two 
paths. In one execution path (path 1), DAACS notes 
the path BLOCK A-BLOCK B-BLOCK C with Block 
B being executed one or more times. DAACS also 
notes another execution path (path 2) is: BLOCK A-
Figure 3: A control-flow graph of the instructions dis­
played in Figure 2. 
BLOCK C. With this VAR2 is reset, so we do not know 
what its value was at instruction 2. Moreover, VA� 
and VAR4 are reset, so their values are unknown too. 
A certain diagnosis will not be possible. DAACS can 
employ such control flow analysis to build a graph of 
execution paths that show possible channels for errors 
through a program. Once we have identified paths, we 
can attempt to refute paths with a logical analysis. 
5 UNCERTAINTY ABOUT 
ERRORS ON PATHS 
We have explored the application of probabilistic in­
ference to autonomously evaluate and order executions 
paths for further study by software engineers. In this 
work, we apply expert knowledge about the proba­
bilistic relationships between structural and numerical 
information within each path, and work to assign a 
probability that the problem resides within each path. 
For each path, we also report the relative likelihoods 
of alternative classes of problem. We have made sev­
eral assumptions at this phase of our research. First, 
we make the typically valid assumption that problems 
leading to observations about invalid memory access 
are located on a single path. Second, we assume that 
all paths are equally likely to be the source of the error. 
We shall discuss work on the relaxation of this assump­
tion in Section 6. Third, we assume that the paths 
identified by the logical analysis serve as the complete 
set of possibilities. Although this is typically valid, in 
some cases, we may not generate all valid paths. In 
such cases, the priority to exploring the paths assigned 
by the likelihoods will still be correct, given our other 
assumptions. 
We have constructed distinct belief networks for key 
types of problems that can be detected by an operating 
system. The belief networks are constructed for appli­
cation to each path identified by the logical analysis to 
provide an ordering over the paths for prioritizing the 
efforts of a software engineer. For each path on a list 
ordered by likelihood, the networks provide a subdivi­
sion assignment of the likelihoods of alternative classes 
of problem, should the problem be on that path. 
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The belief networks represent uncertain relationships 
about the nature and structure of a path and the like­
lihood that an error resides on the path, given that 
the path was taken by program. As depicted in Figure 
4(b), each application of a belief network to a path, 
relevant to the key problem detected by the operating 
system, allows us to do Bayesian reasoning about the 
probability of alternate forms of error on that path. 
We assess probabilities from expert engineers (or ac­
quire data from debugging experience) of the form: 
p(path findings I path error class). The system com­
putes probabilities p(path error classjpath findings) . 
For n paths identified, we assume prior probabilities 
p(pathjn) = 1. Our uniform prior assumption is valid, 
given our reiiance solely on the deterministic path 
analysis provided by the logical reasoner. 
In practice, the logical component of DAACS gener­
ates all of the execution paths that could have led to 
an error detected by the operating system. In the un­
certainty component of the analysis, prior probabilities 
are generated as a function of the number of paths, and 
each path is analyzed by the belief network relevant to 
the main error. After all paths have been analyzed 
and probabilities are renormalized, an ordering over 
the paths is output to engineers to direct their atten­
tion to paths in order of likelihood. For each path, in­
formation is relayed to engineers about the likelihood 
of different problems on the path, conditioned on the 
path being the source of the problem. 
Consider the example of a network built to examine 
PASTHELD problems. The PASTHELD network com­
putes, for each path, likelihoods of the form p(  error 
class on pathjpath-structure findings) for classes of er­
ror that describe different ways that an inappropriate 
value was assigned to an offending variable: 
• BAD SET: Instructions in the segment have im­
properly initialized the erroneous variable. 
• BAD ADJUST: Instructions in the segment have 
improperly modified a value stored in the variable 
(e.g. addition, multiplication, shift instructions) 
• ENTERED BAD: The variable is not modified on 
the path, and so was assigned an invalid value 
before entering the segment being analyzed. 
• BAD LOOP: There are errors with loop index ini­
tializations, adjustments, and exit tests that led 
to the erroneous value of the variable. 
The PASTHELD belief network considers several key 
pieces of evidence that are associated with the exis­
tence of alternative faults on a path. Evidence col­
lected from a path include information about: 
• SYNTACTIC STRUCTURE: The structure of a 
path (e.g., structure SET FAIL rules out BAD AD" 
JUST errors because no adjustment instructions 
exist on the path). 
Logical Feasible Paths 
Analysis 
(a) 
(b) 
Path 
Figure 4: Set of belief networks used to evaluate paths. 
(a) The belief network for analyzing the probability 
that a problem lies on a path. (b) Analysis of multiple 
feasible paths of a program that have been identified 
by a deterministic analysis of alternative routes to an 
error. 
• CLOSE REGS: The proximity of values of vari­
ables to the value assigned to the erroneous vari­
able. The appearance of close values is an indica­
tion of BAD SET errors. 
• NEG REGS: The presence of large negative val­
ues, which support BAD ADJUST and BAD LOOP 
errors. 
• BORDER PROXIMITY: A measure of how close 
to the end of a valid memory block is being ad­
dressed by actions along a path, e. g., a variable 
initialized prior to a loop entry to point near the 
end of a block indicates a faulty initialization, par­
ticularly if the loop construction itself shows no 
signs of errors. 
A sample inference with a PASTHELD belief network 
is displayed in Figure 5. In this case, DAACS gener­
ates 10 feasible paths to the error. Thus, before we 
collect path-specific evidence, the prior probability of 
each path for harboring the error is assumed to be 0.1. 
Figure 5 shows the result of an analysis of path 6, a 
path with significant probability. The path analysis 
revealed that: 
1. SYNTACTIC STRUCT URE= Set Adjust in Loop 
Fail 
2. NEG REGS= False, and 
3. CLOSE REGS= False. 
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The probability that the error lies on path 6, given 
this information is 0.70, with a breakdown of 0.42 for 
a BAD SET and 0.28 for a BAD LOOP. Other problems 
are ruled out on the path. 
W hile the system uses a rather simplistic approach to 
probabilistic reasoning, it is an extension to the cur­
rent practice of logical and rule based analysis. The 
analysis provided by the system, in conjunction with 
a built in graphical program visualization tool, helps 
guide the programmer in the search for the error and 
trains novice to intermediate-skilled programmers in 
debugging techniques. Expert debuggers estimate that 
the tool will reduce debugging time by 25-50%. More­
over, preliminary metrics indicate that the systems can 
successfully diagnose 10% more dumps than by using 
logical analysis alone. The explanation of findings by 
path has shown to be more natural, and hence more 
understandable, presentation of the results than the 
previous version of the system. 
6 UNCERTAINTY AND PATH 
IDENTIFICATION 
We are working to embed uncertain reasoning machin­
ery in the path-identification phase of DAACS. We be­
lieve that interleaving a probabilistic analysis into the 
path identification procedures so as to consider the 
likelihood that a path-which cannot be refuted with 
a logical analysis-is irrelevant to an error will be use­
ful. Determining the likelihood of execution paths can 
be difficult because we rely on incomplete state of in­
formation about processes leading to an error. One 
source of incompleteness is based on the common prob­
lem that temporal sequences of computational actions 
can destroy valuable evidence about execution paths. 
If an address cannot be derived with certainty, we can­
not derive an execution path with certainty. We are 
examining the use of information about the structure 
of a program, including such information as classes of 
interaction at branching points, to reason about like­
lihoods that different candidate paths were the actual 
route taken on the way to an identified error. We hope 
to automate the computation of probabilities p(path 
executed I structure of program). This would allow us 
to relax our assumption that all valid paths have equal 
prior probabilities of being the fateful erroneous path 
that had been taken by the program. Such analyses 
hold promise for allowing us to make use of statis­
tical information gathered by autonomous operating­
system monitoring agents, which might be designed 
to focus their attention on relevant components of a 
system's operation. 
Uncertain reasoning methods in the identification of 
paths may be especially important in scaling-up pro­
gram analyses beyond a focus on program segments. 
Several probabilistic and decision-theoretic tools may 
be useful for grappling with the complexity of analy­
ses that consider interactions among multiple program 
0 
0 
0 
• �: p(ERROR)=.Ol 
• �: p(ERROR)=.OS 
· �  
PATH FINDINGS 
> SYNTACTIC STRUCTURE: Set Adjust in Loop Fail 
> NEG REGS: False 
> CLOSE REGS: False 
PATH FAU.URE PROBABU.ITY 
p(ERROR ON PATH 6): 0.70 
ERROR BREAKQOWN 
> BAD SET: 0.42 
> BAD LOOP: 0.28 
0 
0 
• EAIH_l: p(ERROR)=.OB 
• �: p(ERROR)=.02 
0 
0 
0 
Figure 5: Sample inference of a PASTHELD Error. 
Path 6 is expanded to display a breakdown of the like­
lihoods of different classes of problem on that path. 
segments. For one, we are interested in exploring the 
value of integrating a higher-level uncertainty analy­
sis, with the path-relevance and path-error analyses. 
As we mentioned in the introduction, early on, we de­
veloped a belief network for reasoning about differ­
ent scenarios that could explain a problem, by looking 
at information about the application and salient vari­
ables. We speculate that we may be able to take ad­
vantage of statistical and expert knowledge about pro­
gram failure at a higher level of detail to use in focus­
ing the uncertainty analyses at the path-identification 
and path-relevance levels. For example, a global uncer­
tainty analysis might be useful for computing the prior 
probabilities of alternative faults that will be used for 
each path analysis. Also, experts may be comfortable 
building and assessing path-error-analysis belief net­
works conditioned on different high-level explanations 
for a problem. Additionally, we are interested in the 
use of decision-theoretic methods to focus the atten­
tion of path-identification analyses, to identify cost­
effective evidence- gathering strategies, and to priori­
tize debugging tasks for a time-pressured software en­
gineer (Horvitz, 1988; Horvitz and Rutledge, 1991) . 
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7 S UMMARY 
We described our approach to software diagnosis based 
on an integration of logical program understanding for 
generating a set of feasible paths, and uncertain rea­
soning for determining the likelihood that problems 
are on specific paths. We plan to move beyond the 
use of purely logical methods for identifying paths, 
and thus, to relax the assumption about the equiv­
alent relevance of paths and partial paths to software 
problems. We also intend to initiate studies to evalu­
ate the fidelity of the methodology by investigating the 
calibration of the likelihoods computed by the system, 
and to investigate the time savings gained by engineers 
who take advantage of the prioritization of software 
paths recommended by DAACS-11. 
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